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Modelling residential water demand in Queensland, Australia: A 
comparative analysis of pricing structures and estimation 
techniques 
Andrew Worthington1, Helen Higgs2 and Mark Hoffmann3
This paper uses monthly data from eleven local governments to model residential water demand 
in Queensland, Australia from 1994 to 2004. In the sample, residential consumption is charged 
using a variety of structures including fixed charges without allowance, fixed charges with 
allowance and excess rates, two-part tariffs comprising an access charge and a flat consumption 
rate and multi-part tariffs with an access charge and two or more limits with increasing 
consumption rates. Water demand is specified as average monthly household water 
consumption and the demand characteristics include the marginal and average price of water 
and daily average maximum temperatures and rainfall. The findings confirm residential water as 
price inelastic, more responsive to average than marginal prices, and more responsive to 
changes in temperature than rainfall. The results also suggest that cross-sectional variation in 
demand is related to local government-specific factors.    
 
1. Introduction 
In 1994 the Strategic Framework for the Efficient and Sustainable Reform of the Australian Water 
Industry was endorsed by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).  After acknowledging that 
Australia is the driest continent, and that a substantial proportion of public investment is tied up in 
water infrastructure, the basic premise of these reforms was the protection of water as a precious 
resource, and the recognition that ongoing improvements in national productivity could only be 
achieved through an efficient and sustainable water industry with incentives to prevent water wastage. 
In terms of residential water pricing, the reforms required the introduction of two-part tariffs (where 
cost-effective) with fully transparent community subsidies (if any) and the minimal free allocation of 
water. In practice, these COAG-initiated industry reforms have mostly led to water-pricing structures 
based on a tariff comprising a fixed charge reflecting the cost of the service provision and a variable 
charge based on the volume of water purchased. But since local governments or councils as the 
providers of residential water supplies in Australia fall under state legislative control, every state and 
territory was then compelled to consider the way it would reform water service charges as part of this 
agreement with the Commonwealth Government.  
In Queensland, Australia’s third most populous state, reforms were first introduced in 1997 for the 
seventeen largest local governments with significant water business activities through amendments to 
the Local Government Act 1993. But rather than making it mandatory for these councils to adopt two-
part tariffs, the legislation required them to assess by December 1998 whether it was cost-effective 
form of water pricing for their own areas [cost-effectiveness related to the cost of introducing metering 
relative to the saving in future infrastructure]. Through the National Competition Policy Financial 
Incentive Package, the State Government assisted Queensland councils with the costs of conducting 
reviews and rewarded progress with implementing the reforms. By 2002/2003 most of the State’s 
larger local governments had adopted two-part tariffs for water services. However, the State 
Government did not legislate to require smaller local governments to consider or adopt water pricing 
reforms. As a consequence, there is wide variation in water pricing structures across Queensland’s one 
hundred and twenty-five local governments. Of course, such reforms need to be considered in the 
context of the increasing scarcity of water supplies and climate change in Queensland. Currently, 
Brisbane’s water catchments are at the lowest level of capacity (34.1%) of any Australian capital city. 
At the same time, Queensland is becoming increasingly warmer and drier with suggestions that 
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average annual temperatures could be 2ºC hotter, and average annual rainfall 15 mm lower, by 2030 
[Department of Natural Resources and Mines, 2005].   
2. Objectives of Analysis 
Clearly, there are very dissimilar water pricing systems in Queensland that reflect very different 
policy objectives, at least at the local level. But a single factor that determines the performance of all is 
the price elasticity of demand. Since the price elasticity of demand determines the quantity response of 
consumers to changes in price it lies at the core of efforts to restrain water consumption, through its 
impact on revenue, the viability and sustainability of water utility services, and through its 
distributional impacts, the fairness and equity of water supplies.  
Accordingly, the primary purpose of this paper, part of a project conducted jointly by the 
Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines and the Queensland University of 
Technology, is to provide measures of the price elasticity of residential water demand in Queensland, 
Australia. This provides a key input into optimal tariff design and demand side management strategies. 
A second purpose is to assay the impact of the introduction of two-part tariffs on residential water 
consumption. This allows an assessment to be made of the potential impacts of the recent policy 
changes regarding water pricing structures. The objectives (and techniques and assumptions) of this 
paper are then clearly similar to other work on residential water demand modeling, including Arbués et 
al. [2004], Billings and Agthe [1980], Creedy et al. [1998], Higgs and Worthington [2001], Hoffmann 
et al. [2006], Höglund [1999], Martínez-Espiñeira [2003], Nieswiadomy [1992], Renwick and 
Archibald [1998], Rietveld et al. [2000] and Thomas and Syme [1988], amongst others.   
3. Data Context 
The information gathered by local governments concerning their residential water supplies is 
generally restricted to the information provided annually to the Queensland Department of Local 
Government, Planning, Sport and Recreation. Even so, there is little consistency in the provision of 
this information; there is a wide range of interpretation and little attempt at standardizing the data 
gathering process. In order to overcome these deficiencies, medium to large local governments were 
approached individually with a request for information on their water pricing and non-pricing 
structures and monthly residential water consumption and the number of connections.  While more 
than a few local governments were willing to provide the information requested, in many cases the 
information provided was either incomplete or of very low frequency. Eleven local governments 
provided suitable data: Beaudesert Shire Council, Bowen Shire Council, Caloundra City Council, 
Cooloola Shire Council, Dalby Town Council, Gold Coast City Council, Mount Isa City Council, 
Noosa Shire Council, Rockhampton City Council, Stanthorpe Shire Council and Warwick Shire 
Council. 
Monthly consumption and connection data was provided by each of these local governments. 
However, the sample period for each council (number of monthly time-series observations in brackets) 
varies. The end date for all series is August 2004 with Caloundra, Dalby, Noosa and Stanthorpe 
starting in July 1994 (122), Rockhamption in September 1994 (120), Cooloola in October 1994 (119), 
Warwick in January 1995 (116), Bowen in July 1995 (110), Gold Coast in February 1996 (103), 
Mount Isa in July 1998 (74) and Beaudesert in July 1999 (62). The eleven councils accordingly 
provide a total of 1,192 monthly observations. A snapshot of the eleven local governments in 
2002/2003 is provided in Table 1 in terms of their Australian local government classification, 
geographic location and climate, demographics and water pricing structures. 
For the eleven local councils included there are four pricing structures in evidence as at 2002/2003: 
a fixed charge with unlimited allowance (Rockhampton); a fixed charge with a free allowance 
followed by some excess charge for consumption over a particular level (Bowen); a two-part tariff 
consisting of a fixed access charge and a cost per unit based on the volume of water consumed 
(Beaudesert, Caloundra, Gold Coast, Noosa, Stanthorpe and Warwick) or a cost per unit that increases 
when consumption reaches certain thresholds, in such a way that the tariff consists of sequence of 
marginal prices for different consumption blocks (Cooloola. Mt. Isa and Dalby). The analytical 
technique used in this paper accommodates these different pricing structures. 
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4. Variable Specification  
The dependent variable is the average monthly quantity of water demanded per household served 
by a local government supplier (DMD). Data for households is collected monthly and includes the 
total residential consumption and total number of residential connections for each local council. With 
this information in hand, average monthly water demand per household is calculated for each month. 
The first independent variable specified is the price of water (PCE). Initially, the marginal price of 
water is used in a marginal price model specification. The demand equations are then re-estimated 
using the average price in an average price model specification. A key feature of demand side 
management policies is clearly the pricing structure and a variety of alternative forms have been 
employed in Australia and elsewhere [Dinar and Subramanian, 1998; Bartoszczuk and Nakamori, 
2004]. The incorporation of both marginal and average prices in this study is intended to address both 
the alternating use of these measures in the literature, and the argument that consumer understanding 
of the average price is often better than the marginal price. Regardless, a negative sign is hypothesized 
when water consumption is regressed against the marginal price or the average price. 
Marginal prices are clearest for fixed tariffs and two-part tariffs with flat rates. In these cases, the 
marginal price is zero or the price per kilolitre, respectively. For pricing with a sequence of 
(increasing) marginal prices, the marginal price for the average level of consumption is calculated: in 
this sample, it is always the price per kilolitre in the lowest block. The average price takes into account 
the fixed or access charges associated with fixed, two-part and multi-part tariffs. This is calculated by 
dividing the total household cost at the average level of consumption by the level of consumption. 
These price measures are, of course, imperfect. Unfortunately, the distribution of household 
consumption in each council, which could have provided more accurate marginal and average prices, 
is not known. 
The other two independent variables are weather and temperature variables. These have been 
shown to influence residential water use in a number of ways.  The amount of rainfall (RAN) measured 
in millimetres (mm), for example, has an influence on garden watering, and also on other activities 
such as washing cars and laundry. It is expected that the higher the rainfall will lead to lower external 
water consumption. Temperature (TMP) in degree Celsius (ºC) has also been shown to influence water 
consumption, with hotter days inferring higher consumption through increased garden watering and 
topping-up of swimming pools. Monthly weather information is sourced from the Australian Bureau 
of Meteorology.    
Table 2 presents a summary of descriptive statistics across the eleven local councils. Sample 
means, standard deviations, minimums and maximums, are reported. As shown, household monthly 
water consumption per connection averaged 47.05 kilolitres across all councils. Across all local 
councils, the marginal water price averaged 37.24 cents per kilolitre, average price per kilolitre $82.07 
and the average daily rainfall and maximum temperature are 2.63 mm and 260C, respectively. As also 
shown in Table 2, average monthly water consumption is the lowest for Stanthorpe, Caloundra and 
Beaudesert with 23.79, 30.55 and 30.97 kilolitres respectively and highest for Bowen, Rockhampton 
and Mount Isa with 81.44, 90.68 and 110.56 kilolitres respectively. The lowest marginal prices in 
cents per kilolitre are Rockhampton (0.00), Bowen (16.92) and Stanthorpe (17.23), and the highest are 
in Gold Coast (55.53), Noosa (67.45) and Caloundra (75.34). Average prices per kilolitre vary from 
39.58 cents in Rockhampton to 100.14 in Noosa. Lastly, average daily rainfall ranges from 1.02mm 
(Bowen) to 4.08mm (Noosa) per month and the average daily maximum temperature is the highest in 
Mount Isa (31.65 degrees) and lowest in Stanthorpe (21.43 degrees).  
Table 3 compares the means of the variables under fixed and fixed with excess tariffs and two-part 
and multi-part tariffs (most of councils changed their tariff structures to the latter during the sample 
period). Levene’s test for equality of variances determines whether the test for equality of means 
assumes equal or unequal variances. With the exception of the daily temperature the variances are 
unequal as are the means. As shown, the quantity demand is significantly lower under two-part/multi-
part tariffs and marginal and average prices are significantly higher. Average daily rainfall is also 
significantly higher in areas using two-part/multi-part tariffs. 
5. Model Specification 
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The time-series data supplied by each local council on water consumption is combined to form a 
panel or pooled data set as a combination of time-series and cross-sectional observations. There are a 
number of ways that can be used to incorporate the structure of pooled data in estimating demand 
equations for water. The estimated model may have a common, fixed or random intercept term. With 
panel data, both the fixed and random effects specifications estimators provide improvement over the 
simple linear or common effects regression model which does not take account of the cross-sectional 
characteristics of each local council. In the fixed effects specification, the council specific effects are 
assumed to be fixed parameters. In the random effects specification, the councils are assumed to 
comprise of a random sample and the council specific effects are assumed to be independently 
distributed with a mean of zero and a constant variance. 
5.1. Common Effects Regression Model 
In the common effects regression model where all the data for the eleven local councils are pooled 
together, a simple assumption is that the parameters do not vary across sample observations. The basic 
motivation for pooling time-series and cross-sectional data is that if the model is properly specified, 
pooling produces more efficient estimates. In the common effects model, it is assumed that water 
consumption is homogeneous across local councils. The common effects model can be written as: 
 ititititit eTMPRANPCEDMD ++++= 3211 βββα   (1) 
where i (i = 1, 2, …, 11) refers to each council, t (t = 1, 2, …, Ti) are monthly observations (in this 
unbalanced panel, Ti ranges between 62 and 122), the dependent and explanatory variables are 
previously defined, α1 is the intercept term which is common across all cross-sections, βs are the slope 
coefficients to be estimated and the eit are independent and identically distributed random variables 
with E[eit] = 0 and E[eit2] = σe2.  
5.2. Fixed Effects Regression Model 
Two additional pooling models considered are the fixed effects (or dummy variable) model and the 
random effects (or error components) model. To start with, the fixed effects model allows the intercept 
term to vary across the local councils. Dummy variables are introduced to take account of the 
differences in the level of water consumption across the local councils. The fixed effects model can be 
represented as: 








where αi represents the intercept coefficient for the ith cross-sectional local council, LCit are dummy 
variables that take a value of unity for observations belonging to the ith local council and zero otherwise. 
All other variables are previously defined. This specification is usually employed when specifying a 
different intercept coefficient for each cross-sectional unit can adequately capture differences in cross-
sectional units. That is, cross-sectional identifiers explain changes from local council to local council.  
5.3. Random Effects Regression Model 
An alternative to the fixed effects model is a random effects model that assumes that the coefficients 
are random variables drawn from some larger population: 
 itiitititit euTMPRANPCEDMD +++++= 3211 βββα    (3) 
where E[ui] = 0, E[ui2] = σu2, E[uiuj] = 0 for i ≠ j, E[uieit] = 0 and all other variables are as previously 
defined. The structure of the model is such that, for a given local council, the correlation between any two 
disturbances in different time periods is the same, and unlike a first-order autoregressive model, does not 
decline as the disturbances become farther apart in time. Further, not only is the correlation constant over 
time, it is identical for all local councils. The inference is that the results from this model may be 
generalized to the whole population from which the sample is taken.   
In this manner, the distinction between the random and fixed effects can be viewed as the distinction 
between conditional and unconditional inference.  With the fixed effects model, inference is conditional 
on the local councils in the sample, whereas the random effects model is more appropriate when we are 
Page 4 of 12 
WORTHINGTON, HIGGS AND HOFFMANN: RESIDENTIAL WATER DEMAND MODELING 
interested in (unconditional) inferences about a larger population. But where the number of cross-sections 
(N) is relatively small and the number of time series (Ti) is relatively large, as in the current analysis, the 
results of the two models may not differ significantly.  
5.4. Reliability Testing 
The procedures used to carry out reliability tests between the models are as follows.  Firstly, the model 
is estimated using common coefficients, and tested against the fixed and random effects specifications 




















∑   (4) 
where u indicates the unrestricted model (fixed or random effects) and p indicates the pooled or 
restricted model with only a single overall constant term (common effects). Under the null hypothesis 
there are no fixed local council specific effects against the alternative that there are local council 
specific effects. Rejection of the null implies that the common effects estimators are biased and 
spurious. 
The second test is used to choose between a fixed or random effects specification. This is 
accomplished using a Hausman test. Under this hypothesis, there are two sets of estimates; one of which 
is consistent under both the null and alternative hypothesis, and another that is consistent only under the 
null. The null hypothesis is that both the fixed and random specifications are consistent, whereas under 
the alternative the fixed effect model is, but the random effects model is not.  The test is based on a Wald 
criterion: 
   (5) ]ˆ[]ˆ()([]ˆ[][ 12 βββχ −−′−== − bVarbVarbKW
where b is the vector of estimated slope coefficients from the fixed effects model and  is the vector of 
estimated slope coefficients from the random effects model and Var(b) and Var( ) are the corresponding 
variance covariance matrices and W is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with K (number of 
explanatory variables) degrees of freedom.  
β̂
β̂
6. Empirical Results 
Table 4 provides the estimated coefficients, standard errors and p-values of the null hypothesis of 
the parameters individually are equal to zero and elasticities (at the means) of the parameters detailed 
in the common, fixed and random effects regression models. The upper panel of Table 4 presents the 
results of a specification with marginal price while the lower panel includes the average price. 
Columns 1 to 4 present the estimated results of the common effects model. The results of the fixed 
effects and random effects models are detailed in columns 5 to 8 and 9 to 12 respectively. Also 
included in Table 4 are statistics for R2 and adjusted R2 and F-statistics and p-values for the joint 
hypothesis test that all slope coefficients are zero.  
Panel data estimation is first specified using common effects. To test for multicollinearity, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) are calculated (not shown). As a rule of thumb, a VIF greater than ten indicates 
the presence of harmful collinearity. Among the independent variables the highest VIF is for the 
marginal price (5.09). This suggests that multicollinearity, while present, will not considerably bias the 
estimated coefficients. The adjusted R2 of 0.391 suggests the common effects model has relatively 
high explanatory power. Since the data are mainly time-series and limited cross-sectional in nature, the 
presence of heteroskedasticity or non-homogeneity of variances of the regression disturbances is 
likely: least squares estimates are inconsistent if heteroskedasticity is evident. Accordingly, the 
estimated heteroskedastic consistent covariance matrix is calculated for an unknown form of 
heteroskedasticity. 
The model first discussed is the common effects specification across all councils with the marginal 
price specification. The estimated coefficients for all parameters are significant at the 1% level of 
significance. Using the F-statistic the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are jointly zero is also 
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rejected at the 1% level. Across all local councils, the greatest effects on water consumption are 
temperature (3.515) and rainfall (-2.718). All elasticities are calculated at the means. The price 
elasticity of demand is -0.112 (inelastic) indicating that a 10% increase in the price of water is 
associated with a 1.12% decrease in the quantity of water demanded. In household level modeling 
when either multi-part tariffs or fixed with excess structures are employed, the price associated with 
the marginal unit of consumption introduces endogeneity. The price coefficient is biased downward 
since the marginal price and quantity are codetermined by the rate structure.  
In all models using the marginal price, the demand is estimated as if it were conditional on 
remaining in the same block range, and hence the price elasticity estimated is also conditional on 
changes in demand being small enough that a household remains in the same block range. An 
analogous issue pertains to models using aggregate data. When the proportion of households 
consuming in a block range is not modeled, the distribution of households across the blocks is 
embedded in the elasticity estimate, and the elasticity is, at best, a conditional elasticity. In the 
common effects model with the marginal price specification, the elasticities for the rainfall and 
temperature parameters indicate that a 10% increase in rainfall is associated with a 1.52% decrease in 
water consumption, while a 10% increase in temperature is associated with a 19.39% increase in water 
consumption per household per month. 
In the fixed effects model with the marginal price specification, all three coefficients are significant 
at the 10% level of significance or lower. The estimated coefficient for the marginal price is positive 
which lies contrary to economic expectations. The price elasticity of demand is 0.016 (elastic) 
indicating a 10% increase in price is associated with a 0.16 % increase in water consumption. Similar 
results were obtained by Barkatullah [1996], and Hewitt and Hanemann [1995], when estimating 
water demand equations in the presence of increasing block rates. Accordingly, the estimate of the 
marginal price variable is biased upwards. Instrumental variable estimation could be used to address 
this problem. However, in order to use instrumental variable estimation the number of exogenous 
variables has to be greater than the number of endogenous variables. Unfortunately, there are 
insufficient exogenous variables to permit the use of instrumental variables in this analysis. The results 
for the random effects model are similar to the fixed effects model. Regrettably, the equations using 
fixed and random effects, even with high explanatory power, cannot be reliably used to predict 
demand for water across local councils in Queensland. 
The models are then re-estimated using average prices. This follows the suggestion that rather than the 
quantity demanded being determined by the marginal price, households make decisions on water 
consumption using the average price; that is, they include the fixed or access charge in their decisions. As 
shown in Table 3, average prices in the sample for fixed and fixed with excess charge structures are 
nearly six times larger than marginal prices and 63% large than marginal prices in two-part and multi-part 
structures. The adjusted R squares for the average price specifications are higher than the marginal price 
specifications in all three – common, fixed and random effects estimations, thus indicating the average 
price specification models have better explanatory power.  
The demand equations with an average price specification, the calculated F test (p-value) for the fixed 
effects and random effects over the common effect model are 565.542 (0.000) and 482.279 (0.000) 
respectively. In both cases, the null hypothesis that there are no council-specific effects is rejected. The 
Hausman test in (5) is used to compare the fixed and random effects models. Under the null hypothesis 
both the fixed and random specifications are consistent, whereas under the alternative the fixed effect 
model is, but the random effects model is not. The Wald value calculated for the water demand model is 
6905.473 across all local councils and is larger than the critical value of 23.6848 (chi-square with fourteen 
degrees of freedom at the 5% level of significance), thus the null hypothesis can be rejected. The fixed 
effects specification out performs the common and random effects models. Only the results for the fixed 
effects model are presented. 
For the fixed effects model with an average price specification, the estimated coefficients for all 
parameters are significant at the 1% level of significance or lower and all estimated parameters conform 
to a priori expectations. Using the F-statistic the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are jointly zero 
is also rejected at the 1% level. Across all councils, the largest effects on water consumption are 
temperature and rain fall. The price elasticity of demand is -0.126 (inelastic) indicating that a 10% 
increase in the price of water is associated with a 1.26% decrease in the quantity demanded. By way of 
comparison, Agthe and Billings [1987] calculated a price elasticity of -0.56, Barkatullah [1996] -0.21, 
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Dandy et al. [1997] -0.78, Garcia and Reynaud [2004] -0.25 and Gaudin et al. [2001] -0.47. In a recent 
study, Hoffmann et al. [2006] calculated a price elasticity of -0.56 for Brisbane. If rainfalls increase by 
10% per month, water consumption will decrease by 0.60% per household per month. With a 10% 
increase in temperature will increase water consumption by 4.86% per household per month. 
The final part of the analysis estimates the impact of two-part tariffs on these parameters. The 
results of a fixed effects specification including average prices are included in Table 5. The basic 
premise used here is that the introduction of two-part tariffs has impacted upon the level of water 
consumption (intercept) and the responsiveness of water consumption to price, temperature and 
rainfall (slope). The introduction of two-part tariffs in each council is specified using a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one for months where two-part tariffs are in place and zero otherwise. As 
shown a $0.01 per kilolitre increase in average prices is ordinarily associated with a 0.06 kilolitre fall 
in the quantity of water demanded. However, under two-part tariffs the same price increase is 
associated with an additional 0.14 kilolitre decrease. The two-part tariff interaction parameters for 
temperature and rainfall are not significant. This indicates that the presence of two-part-tariffs have no 
impact on the responsiveness of the quantity of water demanded to changes in environmental 
variables: that is, the major impact offered by two-part tariffs is the price change and that consumers 
can more clearly identify the change in average prices with two-part tariffs than with alternative tariff 
structures. Importantly, since Queensland consumers react more to average than marginal prices, and 
since average prices are higher than marginal prices, there is the suggestion is that consumers are 
under-consuming because of misperception of the pricing parameter. One possibility is that the non-
price restraints on consumption in Queensland councils during most of the sample period are raising 
the effective price of water relative to the actual price, primarily for discretionary water use.     
7. Conclusion 
The present study uses common, fixed and random effects panel data regression models to estimate 
household residential water demand across eleven local councils in Queensland, Australia. The data is 
supplied directly by each council, where almost all have introduced two-part or multi-part tariffs 
consisting of a fixed access charge with no free entitlement of water and a constant (or increasing) 
consumption charge per kilolitre. The remaining councils have retained either a fixed or fixed with 
excess charge for water.  
Several outcomes are associated with the introduction of two-part and multi-part tariffs in 
Queensland. First, mean marginal prices have increased from 12¢ to 64¢ (433%) a kilolitre while 
average prices (including access charges) have increased from 60¢ to 105¢ (75%). By itself, this 
would suggest that the quantity of water demanded by all households should have fallen. However, the 
evidence presented suggests that since households appear to make consumption decisions on the basis 
of average prices, the percentage change in quantity demanded is not as great as it would have been 
with marginal prices. As a result, the average level of consumption under two-part tariffs, holding 
marginal and average prices constant, is higher than under fixed and fixed with excess structures. Part 
of this is associated with household water consumption and the implementation of two-part tariffs 
trending up at the same time, but part also indicates that the two-part tariff systems in place may not be 
optimal. For example, in inclining multi-part tariff structures, consumption rates are so low, and the 
limits so high, there is almost no meaningful price signal. Moreover, the reliance on high access 
charges in two-part tariffs structures means there is likely to be much misperception of the marginal 
price of water and this further distorts outcomes. 
Second, the price elasticity of demand is relatively inelastic at -0.126. This implies that the price 
mechanism, at present, is not an effective tool for managing the demand and consumption of 
residential water. Depending upon the model specified a 10% increase in the price of water is 
associated with only a 1.26% reduction in the quantity demanded. One possibility is that non-price 
controls on discretionary consumption (garden watering, hosing of hard surfaces, car-washing, filling 
and topping-up of swimming pools) in most Queensland councils effectively limit the impact of price 
changes on non-discretionary (laundry, bathroom and kitchen) and discretionary consumption. That is, 
the quantity of water demanded is unable to be increased with price reductions and households are 
operating close to a low level of non-discretionary consumption.  
Third, it is found that there are factors beyond the control of water authorities that also have an 
influence on residential water demand. The results indicate that consumption varies strongly with 
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temperatures and somewhat less strongly with rainfall. However, there is also sizeable cross-sectional 
variation in consumption that is unrelated to environmental factors and closely linked with unique 
council factors. An obvious candidate is non-price controls such as watering restrictions set in place by 
individual councils to manage demand. Unfortunately, insufficient data was available to explore this 
possibility.  
Finally, since this study takes a demand-side approach, detailed comment cannot be made on 
supply-side decisions like the setting of access charges and consumption rates. However, there is 
arguably unusually wide variation in the marginal and average prices for residential water in 
Queensland, even from geographically adjacent jurisdictions. This is a cause for concern in that the 
pricing structures in place may be more reflective of a desire for administrative convenience, revenue 
stability and political expediency rather than any desire to improve the efficient and sustainable use of 
residential water supplies. This is deserving of further inquiry. 
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ACLG UFM RAV URL URM URS URV URS UFM URM RAL URS 
Latitude (º ´ S)  -27 58 -20 07 -26 48 -26 02 -27 10 -27 59 -20 32 -26 23 -23 22 -28 39 -28 12 
Longitude (º ´E) 153 00  148 10  153 08 153 03 151 15 153 20 139 28 153 05 150 30 151 56 152 02 
Mean temperature (ºC) 19.6 24.2 20.1 20.3 19.1 20.2 25.4 20.3 22.9 15.2 17.5 
Annual rainfall (mm) 915 1010 1575 1138 676 1439 386 1696 947 770 710 
Area (km2) 2854 21177 1094 2,967 48 1407 43343 869 189 2697 4423 
Population (n) 55612 12518 78798 34019 10150 438473 20875 45214 59410 10515 21387 
Population growth rate (%) 3.0 0.9 3.4 1.1 0.4 3.5 -1.7 3.3 0.8 1.3 0.5 
Population density 19.5 0.6 72.1 11.5 212.2 311.7 0.5 52 315 3.9 4.8 
Water connections (n) 6950 4587 34441 9961 4119 191030 6756 18971 22902 2483 7085 





















Basis for charge Meter diameter Fixed Fixed 
Meter 







Fixed/unit charge ($) – 450 – – – – – – 472 – – 
Water allowance (kl) – 750 – – – – – – Unlimited – – 
Excess charge ($/kl) – 0.75 – – – – – – 0.00 – – 
Access charge ($) 233.40 – 78 190 198 173 300 130 – 208 275 
Consumption rate ($/kl) 0.82 – 0.78 290kl@0.422 365kl@0.40 0.70 1050kl@0.60 0.72 – 0.58 0.75 
Consumption rate ($/kl) – – – 290kl@1.158 365kl@0.90 – 1050kl@0.70 – – – – 
Source: Department of Local Government, Planning, Sport and Recreation, Queensland local government comparative information 2002/03.  
Notes: ACLG – Australian Classification of Local Government; UFM – Urban Fringe Medium; RAV – Rural Agricultural Very Large; URL – Urban Regional Large; URM – Urban Regional Medium; 
URS – Urban Regional Small; UFM – Urban Fringe Medium; RAL – Rural Agricultural Large; Access charge - The fixed amount that is levied on each property per year with no annual water allocation. 
This is the component of each property's bill that does not vary with the amount of water used or sewerage produced; Basis for fixed or access charge - The basis on which the water charge is calculated 
(e.g. fixed, percentage of property value, meter size, pedestals, other); Consumption rate - The charge per unit of consumption levied upon each customer for their water use (part of a two-part tariff). This 
is usually expressed as dollars or cents per kilolitre. The same charge may not apply to each unit used by the customer. There may be steps in the charge as usage increases past certain levels; Excess 
consumption charge - Any charge for water used after the fixed charge annual allocation has been consumed; Fixed charge - One charge per annum for water or sewerage services. Includes an access 
charge with an annual allowance or unlimited usage for water services; Pricing structure for water - The method of calculating the water charges to be levied on a property (e.g. fixed charge with unlimited 
consumption; fixed charge plus an excess water consumption component; unit charge with an excess water consumption component; two-part tariff; or a hybrid of any of these); Water properties connected 
- The total number of properties connected to the service water system and separately billed for water supply; Population density – Population/area. 
 






Table 2. Monthly Descriptive Statistics to August 2004 



























Mean 47.05 37.24 82.07 25.95 2.63 42.33 55.53 94.38 24.87 3.52 
Std. dev. 27.45 30.61 34.00 4.31 2.81 5.83 19.75 20.27 2.98 3.04 
Minimum 17.29 0.00 4.65 13.94 0.00 30.93 8.34 43.37 19.75 0.04 


















Mean 30.97 34.39 98.70 26.00 1.95 110.56 53.41 77.01 31.61 1.47 
Std. dev. 6.11 40.79 49.61 3.40 1.91 21.39 6.65 8.63 4.32 2.55 
Minimum 19.17 0.00 39.72 20.23 0.04 59.40 41.74 61.44 22.68 0.00 








Mean 81.44 16.92 87.52 29.46 1.02 33.51 67.45 100.14 25.21 4.08 
Std. dev. 15.64 9.95 28.48 3.21 1.76 6.07 3.24 6.49 2.74 3.87 
Minimum 46.92 0.00 63.90 24.08 0.00 23.02 64.00 87.08 20.10 0.05 













Mean 30.55 75.34 97.83 25.04 3.93 90.68 0.00 39.58 28.44 1.71 
Std. dev. 6.39 0.96 4.93 2.92 3.36 6.20 0.00 3.96 3.30 1.91 
Minimum 19.87 75.00 89.43 19.84 0.06 81.13 0.00 32.51 21.90 0.00 




















Mean 36.77 27.72 84.37 25.82 3.79 23.79 17.23 47.69 21.43 1.91 
Std. dev. 7.59 20.01 18.53 2.99 3.25 4.08 26.33 60.73 4.58 1.51 
Minimum 22.55 0.00 32.75 20.06 0.03 17.29 0.00 4.65 13.94 0.00 






38.73 57.00 155.12 29.42 7.06 
Mean 36.33 18.66 87.71 26.67 1.76 33.58 37.08 96.10 23.99 1.71 
Std. dev. 10.00 12.28 19.84 4.56 1.62 9.01 32.68 33.89 4.54 1.38 
Minimum 21.27 0.00 64.09 18.06 0.00 19.21 0.00 43.98 16.50 0.03 














Notes: The end date for all series is August 2004 with Caloundra City Council, Dalby Town Council, Noosa Shire Council and Stanthorpe Shire Council starting in July 1994, Cooloola 
Shire Council in October 1994, Rockhampton City Council in September 1994, Warwick Shire Council in January 1995 Bowen Shire Council in July 1995, Gold Coast City Council in 
February 1996, Noosa Shire Council in July 1998 and Beaudesert Shire Council in July 1999. 
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Table 3. Comparison of Means 
 Tariff structure  means 
Levene's test for equality of 
variances 









F-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
Demand (kl) 51.116 42.752 21.110 0.000 4.899 0.000 
Marginal price (¢/kl) 11.431 64.460 34.113 0.000 -55.488 0.000 
Average price (¢/kl) 60.107 105.229 76.735 0.000 -28.456 0.000 
Average daily maximum (ºC) 25.979 25.927 1.365 0.243 0.191 0.849 
Average daily rainfall (mm) 2.325 2.945 23.407 0.000 -3.506 0.000 
 
Table 4. Estimated Regression Models 
 Common effects Fixed effects Random effects 
Variable Coefficient Std. error p-value Elasticity Coefficient Std. error p-value Elasticity Coefficient Std. error p-value Elasticity 
Constant -31.775 4.341 0.000  – – – – 25.878 5.421 0.000  
Marginal price  -0.142 0.022 0.000 -0.112 0.020 0.012 0.089 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.194 0.014 
Temperature  3.515 0.176 0.000 1.939 0.888 0.082 0.000 0.490 0.900 0.075 0.000 0.497 
Rainfall -2.718 0.338 0.000 -0.152 -1.083 0.160 0.000 -0.060 -1.092 0.104 0.000 -0.061 
R-squared 0.393 – – – 0.911 – – – 0.909 – – – 
Adj. R-squared 0.391 – – – 0.910 – – – 0.909 – – – 
F-statistic 218.250 – 0.000 – 785.974 – 0.000 – – – – – 
F-test  – – – – 588.344 – 0.000 – 516.076 – 0.000 – 
Hausman test – – – – – – – – 6466.191 – 0.000 – 
Constant -16.467 4.580 0.000  – – – – 32.533 4.071 0.000  
Average price  -0.225 0.020 0.000 -0.392 -0.072 0.007 0.000 -0.126 -0.073 0.010 0.000 -0.128 
Temperature  3.424 0.169 0.000 1.889 0.881 0.080 0.000 0.486 0.902 0.073 0.000 0.498 
Rainfall -2.627 0.317 0.000 -0.147 -1.080 0.157 0.000 -0.060 -1.095 0.102 0.000 -0.061 
R-squared 0.445 – – – 0.916 – – – 0.912 – – – 
Adj. R-squared 0.443 – – – 0.914 – – – 0.912 – – – 
F-statistic 269.831 – 0.000 – 834.964 – 0.000 – – – – – 
F-test  – – – – 565.542 – 0.000 – 482.279 – 0.000 – 
Hausman test – – – – – – – – 6905.473 – 0.000 – 
Notes: Fixed effects coefficients for marginal (average) prices: Beaudesert Shire Council 9.310 (17.269), Bowen Shire Council 56.041(62.879), Caloundra City Council 11.084 (19.774), 
Cooloola Shire Council 17.387 (24.178), Dalby Town Council 14.174 (21.038), Gold Coast City Council 22.962 (31.014), Mount Isa City Council 83.024 (89.835), Noosa Shire Council 
14.209 (22.910), Rockhampton City Council 67.268 (70.313), Stanthorpe Shire Council 6.481 (10.399), Warwick Shire Council 13.386 (21.197). Random effects coefficients for marginal 
(average) prices: Beaudesert Shire Council -16.759 (-15.553), Bowen Shire Council 29.770 (29.715), Caloundra City Council -14.892 (-13.013), Cooloola Shire Council -8.695 (-8.670), 
Dalby  Town Council -11.944 (-11.837), Gold Coast City Council -3.080 (-1.840), Mount Isa City Council 56.720 (56.475), Noosa Shire Council -11.789 (-9.891), Rockhampton City 
Council 40.958 (37.070), Stanthorpe Shire Council -19.555 (-22.366), Warwick Shire Council -12.668 (-11.611).  
 














Table 5. Estimated Regression Models 
Variable Coefficient Std. error p-value Elasticity 
Average price  -0.060 0.022 0.005 -0.105 
Temperature 0.835 0.093 0.000 0.461 
Rainfall -0.970 0.202 0.000 -0.054 
Two-part tariff 19.354 6.446 0.003  
Two-part tariff × average price  -0.142 0.044 0.001 -0.154 
Two-part tariff × temperature -0.031 0.162 0.847 -0.008 
Two-part tariff × rainfall -0.065 0.280 0.817 -0.002 
R-squared 0.918 – – – 
Adj. R-squared 0.917 – – – 
Fixed effects coefficients: Beaudesert Shire Council 18.601, Bowen Shire Council 63.109, 
Caloundra City Council 14.908, Cooloola Shire Council 23.222, Dalby  Town Council 20.294, 
Gold Coast City Council 29.061, Mount Isa City Council 82.885, Noosa Shire Council 18.350, 
Rockhampton City Council 70.983, Stanthorpe Shire Council 10.973, Warwick Shire Council 
20.141.  
 
